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DLD-040        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3319 
___________ 
 
ERIC WAYNE LOMAX, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
POLICE CHIEF OF ERIE; 
OFFICER DACUS; 
OFFICER DONALD D.; 
CITY OF ERIE POLICE DEPT. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00218) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 10, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: November 22, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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Eric Wayne Lomax appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss.  Because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, we will 
summarily affirm the order of the District Court.    
I. Background 
In September 2010, Lomax filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the 
District Court against the Erie Police Chief, Officer Dacus, Officer Donald D., and the 
Erie Police Department.  He alleged false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of 
the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, arising from his arrest on July 5, 2007.  
Lomax claimed that on July 5, 2007, he was visiting a friend’s house in Erie, 
Pennsylvania, where police officers “broke in[to] the house,” pointed weapons at him and 
his friends, and yelled at them to surrender drugs.  Lomax asserted that the police officers 
then attempted to plant drugs on him, and he was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance and related charges.  A jury acquitted Lomax of the criminal charges on April 
11, 2008.   
In response to Lomax’s complaint, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that Lomax’s claims were time-barred.  The District Court granted defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.  Lomax timely appealed.   
II. Discussion 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of an order granting 
a motion to dismiss is plenary.  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 
 3 
 
2008).  “The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two 
years.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  The alleged constitutional 
violations that Lomax incurred occurred between July 5, 2007, the date of his arrest, and 
April 17, 2008, when the charges brought against him in Erie County were dismissed.  
See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007).  Thus, Lomax’s civil rights action, 
filed in September 2010, was filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations period, and 
is time-barred. 
Lomax argued that he was entitled to equitable tolling.  State law generally 
governs tolling principles.  See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 
2010).  In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations may be tolled by the discovery rule or 
the fraudulent concealment doctrine.  See Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 510, 516 
(3d Cir. 2006).  The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations when an injury or its 
cause was not known or reasonably knowable “despite the exercise of due diligence.”  Id. 
at 510 (quoting Pocono Int’l Raceway v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 
1983).  To invoke the discovery rule, a plaintiff must “establish that he exhibited those 
qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which society requires of its 
members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of others.”  Kach, 589 
F.3d at 642 (citation omitted).  The fraudulent concealment doctrine tolls the statute of 
limitations when “through fraud or concealment the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax 
vigilance or deviate from the right of inquiry.”  Mest, 449 F.3d at 516 (quoting Ciccarelli 
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v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 556 (3d Cir. 1985)).   
Lomax has not established that tolling is justified.  Although Lomax contended 
that he was “only recently made aware of the fact that his constitutional rights were 
violated,” he has not demonstrated that he exercised due diligence.  His argument that 
trial counsel incorrectly informed him that he could not sue the City or police does not 
invoke the discovery rule as lack of knowledge, mistake, or misunderstanding does not 
toll the running of the statute of limitations.  See Pocono, 468 A.2d at 471.  Lomax’s 
argument that the documents regarding his civil action were fraudulently concealed also 
fails because Lomax argued that the Clerk of Court of the Erie County Court of Common 
Pleas, not defendants, had denied him access to documents related to his case.  See Mest, 
449 F.3d at 516.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
